

# THE JAINA GAZETTE

THE MONTHLY ORGAN OF  
THE ALL-INDIA JAINA ASSOCIATION.

Edited by

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
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THE LATE MR. C. S. MEGHAKUMAR, B.A.,

BORN 1896

DIED 14TH OCTOBER 1931



# THE JAINA GAZETTE

VOL. XXVII }  
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MADRAS :  
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## MY BROTHER.

IT is with feelings of intense grief that I have to record the sad death of my beloved brother C. S. Meghakumar at the age of 35. He was born in the year 1896 and educated upto the Intermediate in the Findlay College at Mannargudi. He studied his B. A. with History and Economics as his special subjects in the Pachaiyappa's College at Madras and took his degree in the Madras University. During his student career both at Mannargudi and Madras he was very popular among the students and was very much liked by the Professors for his fine manners, debating capacity and studious habits.

When he left the College, his Professors were pleased to speak of him as follows :—

Professor M. Ruthnasawmy, M.A., Bar.-at-Law, the Principal of the Pachaiyappa's College, Madras, said,

"It gives me pleasure to say that Mr. C. S. Meghakumar who has passed his B. A. degree examination from this College was a very intelligent and industrious student. His conduct and character were very good. He also used to take an interest in extra college affairs e.g., in the Jain Gazette. He is well fitted for social service."

\*

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Professor C. S. Srinivasachari, Professor of History, Pachaiyappa's College, said,

"It gives me great pleasure to testify to the high opinion I have formed of the character and capacity of Mr. C. S.

Meghakumar, B.A., who was my student in the B. A. class in this College. He was one of the few students at the top of a particularly large class and he took particular pains with his studies, evincing always a great interest in the examination of Indian historical and political problems. He is a Jain of very wide interests and has a taste for the study of Jain books and he is marked by an intelligent appreciation of Tamil literature which has been so largely built up by Jain scholarship."

\*


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Professor S. K. Yegnanarayanier, M.A., Professor of English, Pachaiyappa's College, said,

"Mr. C. S. Meghakumar was my student for 2 years in the B. A. classes of this institution. He belongs to the educationally backward community of Tamil Jains. He is a good student of Jainism that branch of ancient India<sup>n</sup> Philosophy which is often neglected by the average student of Indian Philosophy who takes that term as being synonymous with Vedanta philosophy and that mostly according to Sankara's School. Mr. Meghakumar read a paper on Jainism at one of the sessions of the Universal Religious Conference organised in Madras and as I happened to be connected with that I know that the paper was well-appreciated. As a student he produced very good impressions upon me by his studious habits and exemplary behaviour."

Even while he was a student, he showed great interest in things connected with Jaina religion and community. He was a regular reader of the Jaina Gazette which our father was getting ever since it was started. While we were studying at Mannargudi we started the Jaina Student's Association in order to promote the spirit of *esprit de corps* among the students. My brother was its Secretary for several years and he succeeded in celebrating its anniversaries on grand scale with distinguished gentlemen as Presidents and speakers. Very soon the Association became famous in the district and very popular among the Jains. But after



C. S. MALLINATH.

## CONDOLENCE MESSAGES.

The following are some of the condolence letters which we have received.

Jaina Dharma Bhushana, Dharma Divakara, Brahmachari Sital Prasadji writes :—

"I am very sorry to read in the Jain Mitra that your younger brother breathed his last. The world is transitory. You know Jain Philosophy well. Be consoled by that meditation. Don't lose heart. Do whatever you can for Jainism for the rest of your life."

\* \* \*

The Editor, "Jain Sansar", Delhi, writes :—

"It is with great regret that I have learnt from a correspondent the sad news of the demise of your learned younger brother. Though I am not intimately connected with you, I feel there exists between us that common bond of brotherhood and blood which bind us together. It is with this feeling I offer my heartfelt sympathies in the sad bereavement. May the soul of the departed brother rest in heaven is my prayer to Vir Bhagwan."

\* \* \*

Mr. Ajit Prasada, M.A., LL.B., 5 Ferozepur Road, Lahore, writes :—

Your post card containing the sad announcement of Mr. Meghakumar's death has caused me much pain. How very young and full of promise he was, and how very suddenly was he taken away from us. The Jain community is having a deplorable time of it. Our best and most promising men are leaving us. I had never seen him, but had known him for 15 years or more through his loving letters full of enthusiasm for Jainism.

\* \* \*

Mr. Chaitan Das, B.A., P.E.S., (Retired), Secretary, All-India Jain Association, Malhipur, writes :—

"I am extremely sorry to hear the sad news of the death of your brother Mr. Meghakumar, B.A. He always served the Jain community with great sincerity and interest and worked

for it at great self-sacrifice. His loss is irreparable. On behalf of the Association and myself I offer my most sincere condolence and sympathy to the berieved family."

\* \* \*

Mr. V. P. Kothari, B.A., LL.B., High Court Pleader, Gulbarga, writes :—

"I am extremely sorry to learn the sad news published in the "Jain Mitra," Surat, about the sudden death of your younger brother Mr. Meghakumar, B.A. His sudden death in the prime of youth has caused a great loss not to your family alone but to the whole Jain community. I learn that he was a research student in ancient Jain History and as such his valuable services were quite indispensable to our society. But we are simply spectators of the events of the world. The laws of karma are inevitable and I fully sympathize in your heartfelt sorrows and pray to the Almighty Arahant to bestow on the departed soul full peace."

\* \* \*

Professor C. S. Srinivasachari, M.A., M.R.A.S., writes :—

"I am so very sorry to hear of the death of your younger brother, Mr. Meghakumar at this untimely and premature age. In him has passed away a good scholar and one of nature's fine gentlemen. I hope you will have the fortitude to bear with this loss in patience."

\* \* \*

Mr. Jeshinglal K. Mehta, Managing Partner, Messrs. Surajmal Lallubhai & Co., Madras, writes :—

"I extremely regret to learn from my clerk that your dear brother died of dropsy. The information was a severe shock to me and I only pray to God to give you sufficient courage to bear the loss. May his soul rest in peace."

\* \* \*

Mr. A. K. Appandai of Tindivanam, writes :—

"I am very sorry to hear the sad news of the death of your beloved brother. By the death of Mr. Meghakumar the South Indian Jains have lost one of their educated gems,"

\* \* \*

Itihasa Tattva Mahodadhi Jainacharya Vijaya Indra Suri, Shivpuri, writes:—

“Your two letters to hand. When I went through them, my thoughts reflected on the fruitlessness of Samsara. Whatever comes into the world, must leave it one day. But if it goes in due time, there is no worry; if it goes untimely it gives trouble to all. Srijut Meghakumar's death will give excessive grief to every one who was well acquainted with him. But the world is transitory. It is not in the hands of any one to change its nature. We have only to endure what we cannot avoid. If we entertain grief we will bind only karmas; but if we reflect on the true condition of the world, it will help us to cast off karmas. You are a learned man. Therefore you should practise *dharma* and that is your duty.”

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Mr. S. Jayaramiah of Kumbakonam, writes:—

“Extremely sad to hear of the untimely death of your brother Mr. Meghakumar. He was of very genial, kind and loving disposition. The loss is irretrievable.”

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Sriman Sarkarai Ramaswami Pulavar, Tamil Pandit, Annamalai University, writes:—

“I am extremely sorry to hear the sad news of the premature death of your noble brother, Meghakumar. He was a very intelligent and promising young man. His death has caused a great loss to South India in general and to the Jain community in particular.

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Mr. K. Seethapathi Mudaliar, Teacher, Kadavur, writes:—

“The news gave a shock to me. It gives me intense grief. I do not know what pain his separation will give you. He was to you what Lakshman was to Sri Rama. My heart is with you in your grief.

## AN APPEAL TO SCHOLARS.

RELIGIOUS and moral instruction has now come to be recognised as a great factor in education, and an important agent in the building up of character, which is and ought to be the aim of all educational institutions. The Jain community, along with other communities, has keenly felt the necessity of such instruction, and has from time to time made various efforts in the direction of the compiling of a graded series of religious text-books to facilitate the assimilation of religious principles and the study of religious literature. But it must be regretfully admitted that such efforts have not yet succeeded in supplying the greatly felt need. I am therefore prompted to do what little I can in that direction by financing a scheme that will place in the hands of the young Jains religious text-books of the required standard, and have entrusted the work of compiling a graded series of suitable books on Jainism to Professor H. R. Kapadia, M.A., (Bhagatwadi, Bhuleshwar, Bombay). Deeply read in Jain literature, Professor Kapadia, I feel, is well fitted for the task and will be able to do full justice to the spirit of Jain culture. In the projected series he will deal with several subjects, such as Ethics, Metaphysics, Psychology, Ontology, Sociology, Logic, Philosophy, Rituals and so forth, of course in a way adapted to the intelligence and capacity of the respective class of readers. Since this series is mainly intended for Primary and Secondary Schools, it is to consist of twelve manuals.

In order that the labours of Professor Kapadia in the field of Jain Religious Literature coupled with the necessary financial aid offered by me, may yield the desired results, I earnestly appeal to scholars to help in the achievement of the object we have all in view, by suggesting the method to be adopted, the works to be consulted, the subjects to be treated, the illustrations to be incorporated and so on. Thereby they will not only be obliging me personally, but also serving the Jain community. I, therefore, hope and

trust that my appeal will be received in the best spirit and that response will come from both Jain and Non-Jain scholars in the form of useful and helpful suggestions, which will go a great way to ensure the success of our humble undertaking.

Jiwan Villa  
Malabar Hill  
Bombay.

—JIVANLAL PANALAL.

---

### MEMORY.

A curtain of memory screeneth my heart  
From the winds of the desert ;  
Ragged and worn, and patched from the years  
It is true,  
Yet is strong to enfold ;  
For the warp and the woof of its weaving  
Are silver and gold from the land of the soul,  
Where the products are made to  
Change not their lasting,  
From the heat, or from cold,  
Or from rain-storms of darkness  
Or terror by day,  
In the strength of their fury.

---

My curtain of memory holdeth its hues  
While the things that are round it are fading !  
Beauteous tints, and pure, in the light of decades,  
And the glory of Soul Land.

Toowoomba  
Australia.

—M. AMY THORNETT,  
June 16, 1931.

---

# THE AGE OF LORD RISHABHADEO.

BY

L. A. PHALTANE,

(*Pleader, Islampur.*)

FINDING references in books of brother religionists about Lord Rishabhadeo is one kind of attempt to draw inferences regarding the age of the sage. But I am trying to bring before the eyes of the readers another set of circumstances which will help them to draw further inferences regarding his age. For that purpose I am solely confining myself to the authority of Mahapuran of Jinasena.

Though clothed with many unrealities the tradition is always attended with some truth which forms the basis of the tradition. Power of determining which portion of the tradition contains the truth differs with the individual and this difference is at the root of the divergences of opinions that are obtaining in these days.

From the Mahapuran it becomes clear that the seat of religious and political supremacy in northern India at the time of Lord Rishabhadeo was Ayodhya and territory round about that city. That province was called Aryakhanda and the people at a distance from that province were called vyantaras. It is to be noted that Bharat came across sea in his eastern conquest after about two days' march from Ayodhya and the country of the Magadhas had to be conquered by crossing the sea. The warriors of Bharat were shouting.

“Adyasindhūṃ prayatavyam gangadwāre niveshaṇam  
Sānsadhyo Magadhodyaiva vilanghya payasam  
nidhim.”

(“To-day we must approach the sea and must make a halt at the mouth of the river Ganges. The king of the Magadhas is to be attacked to-day by crossing the sea.”)

Approaching the sea-shore Bharat went into the sea in his chariot and sent an arrow into the residence of the king of the Magadhas. The tradition therefore shows that the part of the country towards east from about fifty or sixty

miles to the east of Ayodhya was under waters of the sea which separated Magadha from Ayodhya province. The country of the Magadhas or the province Bihar of the modern days was then an island. This does not appear an improbability from the fact that even now the country east of Agra is just near the sea-level.

It appears that the people of the then Ayodhya province were a new colony. The colonisers appear to have been an energetic and organised people. Bharat was not required to fight any battle in his eastern conquest. The eastern part of India was then peopled by black-skinned Bhillas. Both the sides, northern and southern, of the Vijayardha mountains were inhabited by a very civilised people called Vidyadharas. They were held in high esteem by the people of Ayodhya. The description of the Vijayardha mountains is as under

“Madhya Bharatavarshasya sthitam tam Mandandawat  
Swapurvaparkotibhyam vigahya lavanarnavam ”

(“ This mountain lay like a measuring rod in the middle of Bharatvarsha with its eastern and western extremities going into the sea.”)

And this description exactly tallies the Vindhya mountains and the Satpura ranges of the present day. Some of the towns which are mentioned as existing on this part of the country can be shown to be existing even now. Moreover Nala, Nila, Sugriva, Vali and other heroes of Ramayana were wellknown to be the inhabitants of this part of the country. So we can safely say that the Vijayardha mountains are the same mountain ranges which are known as Vindhya and Satpura ranges at present. They had attained a high state of civilization long before the advent of the new colony of Ayodhya. This Vidyadhara race has been described as a very distinct race from the races of Ikshwaku and Hari of the north. This highly cultured race was held in so much reverence owing to its all round prosperity and culture that the people of Aryakhanda came to consider that the fourth cycle of times ever obtained there. The name Vijayardha

also appears to have derived its origin from the unique position the people on that part were enjoying.

Another group of people who were enjoying considerable civilization were known as Nagakumaras inhabiting the Patala or the low lying lands near the sea-shore. The Lord of these people named Dharana is said to have come to Lord Rishabha to remove the obstruction caused to him in his meditation. He is made to say

Mam vittam kinkaram bhartuh Patala swargarasinam  
"Know me to be the servant of the Lord residing in the swarga of Patala."

The rest of the northern India was not inhabited by any civilized people. In those days the people on the islands and shores were held in great reverence and were called Vyantara gods.

We may summarise what is given above in the following words:—

(1) Ayodhya was the first seat of religion and empire in Aryakhanda.

(2) In the days of Lord Rishabha the province of Bihar was an island separated by sea from the rest of India.

(3) The Table lands of the Vindhya and Satpura mountains enjoyed a civilization which was established long before Lord Rishabhadeo.

(4) The low lying sea shore also was enjoying a civilization which extracted admiration from the people of Aryakhanda.

(5) The rest of the portion of the northern India was uninhabitable.

It is now admitted on all hands that as the earth became cooler and cooler its parts which were fit for habitation at one time became unfit for that purpose while other parts which were unfit owing to circumstances of heat and climate, became habitable as the adverse circumstances of heat and climate ameliorated. Now-a-days the uplands of the Vindhya mountains have become unfit for cultured habitation. What

might have been the time required for the earth to undergo such a change is a question which ought to be solved by Geologists. We can only say that it was a very ancient time.

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## THE 5 LABDHIS.

BY

C. R. JAIN.

**A**S the Tirthamkaras have taught, no one can acquire Right Knowledge unless he be endowed with what are known as the *labdhis* first. One may be very learned and even thoughtful; but unless the *labdhis* are present and operative in his intelligent nature he will not attain to Right Knowledge. In Europe, for instance, very many brilliant men like Kant, Herbert Spencer, Darwin—have arisen, but not one of them was possessed of the real thing—Right Knowledge!

What is Right Knowledge, then? How is it to be distinguished from what is not Right Knowledge?

Right Knowledge is knowledge of things that matter, and is free from, error, doubt and ignorance. Strictly speaking Right Knowledge is possessed only by the *Kevalis* (who have attained to Omniscience); but for practical purposes what is essentially in agreement with the Teaching of the All-Knowing Souls is also termed Right Knowledge.

What are the things that do matter, whose knowledge is so very essential?

They are the things that will enable the miserable mortal termed man to obtain Immortality, Perfection in respect of Knowledge and Bliss and Power! In Europe they will still laugh at you if you say this before their learned men! That is why I have said above that not one of the European thinkers was possessed of Right Knowledge. Even within the range of the materialistic sciences their knowledge is incomplete and not free from error, doubt and ignorance. Faraday and Newton, for instance, had ideas of electricity and gravitation which the men of to-day think were involved

in error, at least in certain particulars. All that you can say about their claim to Right Knowledge is that, in a certain measure, they possessed an inclining into certain aspects of the nature of certain things ; but Right Knowledge is too sacred a term to be applied to what is at best only a working hypothesis for further materialistic research. I am not desirous, by any means, of robbing the great men of science of their meed of praise in so far as it is merited for selfless labour and investigation of natural phenomena. Far from it ; I am only anxious to develop the point that they have ignored the investigation both of things that really matter as well as of the ultimate conclusions in their own limited field, for which reason they have failed to attain to Right Knowledge. So far as working hypotheses are concerned, all practical workers are likely to have them, from the gardener and the cook upwards, but surely we do not call the knowledge of the most excellent of cooks and the best of gardeners Right Knowledge ! The one, no doubt, has some conception of the material he uses for his dishes ; the other, too, is not altogether without an idea about seeds, and sprouts, and seasons, and soils and sowings. But the gardener has no knowledge of the life in the seed, what it is that bursts forth from the seed and out of the soil, whence the flowers and the bloom, whence the delicate tints and the life that is so exquisite and lovely and joyful ? The cook who cuts up a fowl with as much callousness as a cucumber is likewise ignorant of the nature of the life that he has destroyed with a single stroke of his knife ; he knows little or nothing about the reason why a cucumber should be just only a cucumber and a fowl different from a cucumber, and why should they both be inferior to and helpless before man, who is able to destroy them at his sweet will ?

The *Jinas* have taught : The world is full of misery ; yet there is a way to the attainment of incomparable Bliss ; Life is every where beset with death, yet there is a way to the obtainment of Immortality ; man is enshrouded in gross ignorance, yet there is a way to the acquisition of Full

Knowledge! The *Jinas* not only taught thus to mankind; They actually attained to the things which They have set as Ideals before us! The whole world bore testimony to Their attainments in the past.

It is the knowledge that enables one to attain to these Great Ideals that is termed Right Knowledge.

In Europe no one has ever acquired this knowledge, and even men who have upheld the existence of soul, have not understood anything further about its nature. Not one of the western philosophers has had his attention directed to the point whether Omniscience and Bliss appertained to the nature of the soul, and could be brought into realization by the removal of the causes that hindered their functioning.

The reason for the inability to attain to the right kind of knowledge lay, in each and every instance, in the lack of the *labdhis*, as already stated. These *labdhis* are 5 in number, and may be described as follows :—

1. loosening of powerful *karmas* that keep the mind deluded—the fanatic's delusions stand in the way of his turning to the true light;
2. special clarity of the intellect which is tantamount to the acquisition of the scientific turn of mind, that will not be satisfied with what is irrational, and which shuns superstition;
3. the opportunity to hear and the hearing of the true information about the nature of things;
4. a still further loosening of the forces of deluding *karmas*—passions, emotional excitability and the like, which turn the thought into wrong channels; and
5. actual thinking out of the problem of Life.

It will be seen that a fanatic will simply not let any one propound the true doctrine, and will never be induced to ascertain whether the views he himself holds be correct or otherwise. He is in the grip of powerful deluding *karmas*! The same is the case with those who are blinded by uncon-

trollable passions—excessive greed, pride, deceit or anger. Even when these forces of delusion are happily curbed it is not enough. There must be clarity of the intellect; even intellectual drowsiness will suffice to prevent the mind being impressed with the need for scientific thought. Then comes the hearing of the discourse, that is the true explanation of the nature of things, to be adopted as a basis for investigation. The thesis is too sublime to be formed spontaneously by the mind in the first instance. But even all this that has been accomplished thus far is not sufficient; for it is still possible for the mind to reject the teaching, unless the fourth *labdhi*—further clarity of the intellectual nature, that is sobriety of thought, is present to counteract the tendency that will reject the doctrine in haste. And, finally, there must be actual thinking and grappling with the subtlest of the problems of Life, effectively, to arrive at satisfactory results.

In the case of those learned speculators who are not possessed of the *labdhis*, their very 'brilliance' prevents their bestowing adequate time and thought on the greatest of all the problems; they are chokeful of their assumptions and presumptions, and prone to reject the true hypothesis at once. Some of them will not even take the trouble to understand what they are required to criticise and consider it beneath their dignity to find out what religion really taught, or are ready to accept, in a hurry, the views of any particular individual or sect and take them to be the universally accepted version of things.

I may refer to the following criticism of soul nature by Prof. Strong (see McDougall's "Body and Mind," page 124):—

"What could the soul itself, apart from consciousness be? It has been carefully distinguished from and opposed to consciousness, therefore it cannot have the latter's luminous nature.....For the existence of consciousness is our existence. If the soul should continue but consciousness cease, we should be as good as non-existent; whereas if the soul should be annihilated but consciousness still go on, we should exist as truly as now. Thus our existence is bound up with

that of consciousness, not with that of the Soul; or, as I said before the existence of consciousness is our existence."

The error in the above is clearly in the assumption that the teaching was that the soul was separate from consciousness. The criticism is justified; but the learned professor was prevented, by what we would call the forces of deluding *karmas*, from a full and proper enquiry concerning the teaching of Religion about the nature of the Soul. He should not have accepted the statement of a partial scholar as the view of Religion proper; for Religion proper has always maintained that the soul cannot be separated from consciousness; rather on the contrary, its teaching only is that Soul and Intelligence are but two words which describe what is only one thing. Soul is Knowledge (consciousness), Knowledge is Soul; and because the two are actually inseparable from one another, therefore when the causes whose operation now debars the Soul from bringing into realization the fullness of its intelligent nature are removed, it will not only remain conscious but become OMNISCIENT. Probably the learned professor only read some of the current Christian views, and hastily jumped to the conclusion that they formed the last word on the subject. Whether any one said or knew any thing different from these current misconceptions of the Christian theologians did not worry him. Is not Christianity the supreme revelation? This is the effect of *haste*, which is itself the outcome of a hasty disposition, in other words, the product of the *karma*—energy which gives rise to a hasty disposition.

The late Professor Haeckel, too, assumed, on the basis of another of the misconceptions current in Christian theological circles, that the soul should be absolutely unchanging always, and proceeded to demolish the view, in his usually brilliant manner. Of course, he was successful in his destructive criticism; but it never occurred to him that what he had demolished, with so much ability and elaboration, was a mere misconception started by a third-rate thinker in theology and not the true view of Religion proper. He was too much in

haste and too much swayed by prejudice to be able to know that. None of his followers has thus far discovered his error. They, too, are prejudiced against the section of men who possess the true views, and too much in haste to formulate and broadcast an opinion to be qualified for the acquisition of truth

The orientalists who laboriously tried to unravel the mysteries of the Wisdom of the East were perhaps less in haste than Haeckel and Strong, but they were swayed by overpowering prejudice against 'heathenism' generally, and could not be induced to look deep into the 'quaint' conceptions they came across in the Ancient Lore. They one and all failed even to realize that most of the Eastern Scriptures were composed in allegorical script. Hurry, prejudice, 'brilliance,' again are responsible for the result. As a matter of fact, the West has still to learn that the language of the Biblical Script too, is pictorial, and not plain. The Orientalists did not understand their own religion, how could they be expected to understand that of any one else?

Amongst the modern books I like McDougall's "Body and Mind" Mr McDougall is a psychologist of note and his refutation of Materialism in its different phases appeals to my mind very much. I give a few quotations from the book named to show how he deals with the arguments of those who would deny the existence of Soul.

".....the biological argument from continuity of evolution makes against Epiphenomenalism; for the appearance of consciousness at some undefined point in the course of the evolution of the animal kingdom, as postulated by it, constitutes a distinct breach of continuity. The argument from inconceivability also makes against Epiphenomenalism more strongly than against Animism; for the notion that material processes should generate consciousness out of nothing is certainly a more difficult concept than that of interaction of soul and body. Again, Epiphenomenalism, though it may perhaps be consistent with the law of the conservation of energy, offends against a law that has a much stronger claim

to universality, namely the law of causation itself; for it assumes that a physical process, say a molecular movement in the brain, causes a sensation, but does so without the cause passing over in any degree into the effect, without the cause spending itself in any degree in the production of the effect, namely, the sensation. It thus saves the law of conservation of energy at the expense of the law of causation .....” (p. 150).

“Quite apart, then, from any question as to what the structure of the mind may be, what stuff it may be built of, we are able to infer its presence and operation from the orderly and lawful regularity of the stream of consciousness, which cannot be explained from the nature of the stream itself and from the nature and the order of succession of the sense-impressions; and we are able to discover a number of general laws of this structure and operation, and to describe how it gradually grows, every moment of conscious life leaving it altered in such a way that its influence upon later coming parts of the stream of consciousness is modified, until its structure and its influence upon conscious life become exceedingly complex. But, as compared with consciousness itself, this conditioning factor, the structure of the mind, is relatively stable and unchanging; to its stability is due all that constancy of mode of conscious reaction which distinguishes one personality from another. The faithful retention of memories through periods of many years, manifested by their subsequent return to consciousness, implies in fact a statical or relatively unchanging condition of something, call it what we may.”—(P. 165).

“When two stimuli are simultaneously applied to the sense-organs of any normal human being, they produce a change in his consciousness which is their combined effect or resultant. This composition or combination of their effects does not take place in the nervous system; the two nervous processes are nowhere combined or compounded; they remain throughout as distinct as if they occurred in separate brains; and yet they produce in consciousness a single effect

whose nature is jointly determined by both nervous processes. These facts can only be rendered intelligible by assuming that both processes influence or act upon some one thing or being; and, since this is not a material thing, it must be an immaterial thing. Our intellect demands this conclusion..... We cannot be content to say that each of the two processes generates or creates a sensation, which two sensations then float off to come together and join the stream of consciousness;.....for even if we could admit that sensations can exist in this isolated manner, the essential problem would still remain—Why do these two sensations come together and why do they join that particular stream of consciousness, rather than any other? The only possible alternative to the hypothesis that this immaterial thing is an enduring psychic entity, is to assert that it is the stream of consciousness itself. Now to say that the cerebral processes act upon consciousness is a convenient and common usage; but, if the statement is to be taken seriously, it implies that the stream of consciousness is not merely the sum of the effects of, or the psychical aspects of, the brain processes, but that it has an independent existence, that it is itself an entity or being. And this would be Animism, but Animism of a peculiarly unsatisfactory kind. We should still have to assert that the stream of individual consciousness as it exists at any moment is not the whole of this immaterial being, and does not reveal its whole nature; we should have to recognize that the constancy of the effects in consciousness produced by the cerebral processes, and their relative independence of the state or content of consciousness at the moment of the incidence of the cerebral influences, are evidences that the immaterial being is more than consciousness and is the enduring possessor of capacities of reacting upon cerebral influences in a number of different ways of which some only are realized at any moment. The psychic being is then more than the stream of consciousness; and the sensory changes of consciousness produced by cerebral changes are only a partial expression of its enduring nature. And, when the effects of

two or more sense-stimuli appear in consciousness combined to a common resultant, this is because the separate cerebral processes act upon this one being and stimulate it to react according to the laws of its own nature with the production of changes in the stream of consciousness. This psychic being, whose nature is thus partially expressed by the production of the unitary sensory content of consciousness in response to the manifold cerebral influences, is that medium of composition of effects, that ground of the unity of consciousness and of psychical individuality, which the intellect demands and which cannot be found in the substance of the brain."

These reasonings are certainly good. Mr. McDougall's book, "Body and Mind," affords very interesting reading. It is sure to appeal to all lovers of the Spiritual Science, especially to Jainas. Mr. McDougall has clearly demonstrated the existence of the soul, though his obstructive *karmas*—'brilliance,' haste and readiness to formulate an opinion—lay hold on him as soon as he has accomplished this task. He makes no further enquiry to ascertain the attributes of the soul substance; he knows nothing about the remaining aspects of the soul-nature, yet does not hesitate to affirm the following from Dr. Mandsley with free and full assurance:—

"To live for ever, having got rid of the flesh with its appetites and lusts, would be to have a vapid and joyless immortality,—the one long bootless desire of which would be an impossible suicide."—"Psysiological Psychology," page 117).

It will be a surprise to him to be told that the ancients not only knew the soul to be immortal but some of them actually acquired that immortality, and were 'filled' with it; they found that Life apart from the body was divine—blissful and endowed with all-embracing knowledge, and lacking nothing!

The Jainas will not also find acceptable the notion of an hierarchy of conscious souls existing in the body of man, and

obeying the orders of one of them, as they do that of a head in an office. The Jainas know that deliberation is not possible without the *dravya-mana* (the organ of thought), which is only one in each human body, and can only be used by the one soul that is attached to it (see my "Jaina Psychology.") The supposed hierarchy of souls will not be able to carry on their work, with deliberation, for the lack of this organ of thought.

I am also not much impressed by the notion of the co-conscious souls. It is unnecessary to postulate more than one soul in cases of multiple personality. These are apparently only cases of split up personality, under the influence of powerful emotion or thought. If the psychic functions are restrained in some way under one set of circumstances and yet are able to function fully under somewhat altered conditions, an emotional being might, not unnaturally, set up a duality of personalities in his consciousness, which personalities will henceforth begin to function more or less independently seemingly.

In other words, if one fall into the way of contemplating one's sentiments in the abstract, he will be apt to think of his having sides or aspects, which he will be likely to personify separately. Then in case of clashing sentiments, he will be prone to describe an action of his that is in conformity with his normal character as his own, and one of the opposite type as the prompting of the "other one" The "other one" when evil-prompting is termed Devil in the mystic literature; and pious devotees, amongst Muhammadans especially, are in the habit of ascribing all base longings of their hearts as the promptings of the Evil One. Under the influence of fear also some persons, especially young adolescent girls in India, deem themselves to be possessed by malignant spirits, and are terrified. Strange phenomena of dual personality are witnessed then. Yet it is only their own thought that has laid hold of their consciousness; none from the outside.

The separately personified sentimental groupings are all able to work with the whole of the emotional outfit of the

ego, and are really only seemingly separate, being all rooted in the unitary force of Will; but it is possible to curtail and limit the range of the activities of any of them by suggestion and auto-suggestion. Sometimes there is a magnifying of the functions of the 'control,' when strange and queer phenomena occur. If the split up personalities both have generally co-extensive functions, it will give us all the phenomena of co-consciousness, without proving the existence of more than one souls, abiding in one organism and consciously carrying on the work of life.

It should be remembered that certain melancholies are amenable to suggestion, and readily fall in with any view that is suggested even indirectly. They readily proceed to a full elaboration of the suggested idea, in every possible way, in their imagination knowing the necessity for a full mental equipment for a deliberative will, we can only say that only one such soul can occupy one body, though there be a number of them in the lowest organisms that are denied the higher life of the animal and man. It would seem that the *dravya mana* and the will cannot be shared by more than one soul in common, and without them deliberate mental action, such as man is capable of, cannot be performed. An hierarchy of conscious souls, inhabiting a single body and living in conscious subordination to one of their number, receiving and communicating information and executing orders, like a well-behaved clerical staff in an office, is not conceivable by the mind, for the foregoing reasons. If every cell is a living being, there may be a large number of souls existing in an organism, but every cell-soul cannot be deemed to be interested in anything beyond its own little 'cellular' world, and cannot be credited with intelligence that will pass out and take stock of the needs of the organism of which it is a part. The service it renders to the entire organism is not of the conscious lust of the mechanical type. The cell-souls are devoid of the organ of thought, and not capable of deliberate choice or conscious action, for that reason. Within their own little sphere of conscious manifestation they perform

their functions instinctively, and are not able to think or act with deliberation.

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## ON BAHURATA SCHISM.

BY

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**P**ERSONALITY of the Teacher, the delicious way in which the religious principles are served and Royal patronage—these are some of the important causes of the spread of any religion. In spite of the original stability, the Main Current of the Church, as time passes on, flows into different beds and so many schisms come to be formed, some slightly and some widely differing from the main stream of doctrines. All great teachers have always tried to keep intact the Main Current and in spite of their efforts schisms took place and weaken the original force.

Jainism could not be an exception to this. We do not know anything definitely as to the history of the Jain Church before Parsvanatha. What we have come to preserve of that period is only Puranic tradition and contemporary documents are absolutely wanting. From Parsvanatha onwards we are on a surer ground and from Mahavira we are accustomed to open the regular history of Jainism. Mahavira only revived what his predecessors had already preached. His was a dominating personality. And he has left behind him a permanent stamp on the Current of Indian thought. When Mahavira passed away his spiritual chair was occupied by various succeeding apostles who too one after another filled it with different degrees of competence.

Shades of interpretation of a particular doctrine depend on the individuals that explain them. Intellectual clarity and capacity and moral responsibility differ in proportion from individual to individual and it is for this reason that the schismatic seeds come to be sown in any religion. Nobody

was more cautious and forethinking than the Great Buddha: he had closely followed the fate of his contemporary teachers. We learn from Samagama Sutta that Buddha heard of dissensions in the Jaina community and he exhorted his disciples not to fall victims to schismatic impulses. But all his precautions were thrown to winds by the coming generations of his disciples: day after day the number of Buddhist schools went on increasing and the very catholicity of theirs proved a deathblow to Buddhism which is no more a practised religion in India but only a subject of antiquarian interest.

Not to speak of the sectarian divisions after the Nirvana of Mahavira, even in his life-time some of his followers raised open objections against Mahavira and tried to promulgate different doctrines. Some of these doctrines were short-lived but still we cannot afford to ignore their study as they shed a good deal of light on the Jaina doctrines themselves. Some of these were not regularly independent religious schools but dissented from the main current in a point or two. In Bhagavati and other texts of the Jaina canon we came across many '*Arya Tirthika*' doctrines such as that of '*Do Veda*,' '*Do Kiriya*' '*Do Ayu*' '*Bahurata*' and others. In the following paragraphs it is intended to discuss the Bahurata doctrine.

In Bhagavati I. Goutama asks Mahavira some mystic questions to which Mahavira replies in the affirmative. The questions run thus: "Sir, Is what is being moved moved? (*chalabana chaliye*) Is what is being raised raised? Is what is being fell fell? Is what is being lost lost? Is what is being cut cut? Is what is being broken broken? Is what is being burnt burnt? Is what is being dead dead? Is what is being exhausted exhausted?" Here we are introduced to the Bahurata doctrine which denied these questions by saying what is being moved is not moved and so on.

The contention of Bahurata doctrine is that one should not state that a particular act is done when it is only being done. It is done only when the process of action has come to an end. When the pot is being made i.e. when the wet

earth is heaped on the potter's wheel and the potter is just giving shape to the mud, we cannot say that the pot is made. The statement that the pot is made would be possible, when the action has come to a standstill and when we have reached the shape of a pot after passing through a series of intermediary shapes. Moreover it is against sense-perception to assert that the pot is made any time before the completion of that process.

The other side would say that the pot is there all the while but becomes manifest only in the end. Had there been no pot, there should be every scope for the cloth to come out: but, as a matter of fact, the cloth does not come out but the pot comes out and hence, really speaking, the above statement is guaranteed. The view that the pot is there only in the end is not well grounded—how can something come out in the end if it is not present there from the beginning. The presence of effect in the process of action will have to be admitted on logical grounds; otherwise we are denying the result of those preparatory activities. Say, for instance, the weaver has put the warp on his loom and begun his operations with the shuttle for some time. Then it would be right to say that the cloth is woven according to the principle what is being woven is woven. If we deny this, the opposite of it *viz.* that the cloth is not woven must be true. In that case, we are declaring the fruitlessness of the weaver's labours. (The logical flaw in this conversion is quite plain). So it is proper to adopt the realistic view and say the cloth is produced even when it is being produced. Whether the whole of it is produced or not; that is a different question for we can never put a limit to that 'whole.'

To bring before our mind's eye the exact difference between the Jaina view and the Bahurata one we must understand the relative pluralism (*Anekānta-vada*) of Mahavira. Many scholars have considered it to be a sophistical weapon of Jaina Logicians of Middle Ages. Some have criticized it in the very tone of Sankaracharya as a reasoning of probable statements where truth is only an uncertain view-point. It

was neither a logical excuse nor a quagmire of verbal quibbles. The Jaina Logicians meant it to be something else: they treated Anekantavada as a sure method of understanding the true nature of reality in all its aspects. No absolute statement is true, nor can it ever be so, so long as human intellect is limited and human tongue so defective. The speaker has always a particular view-point in his mind when he makes a certain statement. Truth or otherwise of a statement must be judged only in the light of that view-point. A partial or formal view may ordinarily be not-objectionable but to understand the nature of reality it is of no great avail. An exaggerated description of a cat may give us some idea of the tiger but it can never be the tiger. It is necessary to differentiate between the two statements 'the cloth is produced' and 'the production of the whole cloth is effected.'

- (i) Even when a portion is woven = the cloth is produced (Jaina view).
- (ii) When the whole cloth is produced = the cloth is produced (Bahurata view)

The significance of Bahurata view becomes quite clear when we know the history as to how it came to be promulgated. After fourteen years of Mahavira's attainment of Omniscience this schism was established in the town of Sravasti by Jamali who was the son of Mahavira's sister and who had married the daughter (Sudarsana) of Mahavira. Jamali along with his beloved Sudarsana had adopted asceticism from Mahavira. For sometime he was a zealous monk intent on the propagation of Jaina principles. The range of his scriptural studies was sufficiently vast and practically he had mastered the eleven Angas. One day he approached Mahavira for his permission to start on a religious tour but Mahavira remained silent without giving any reply. Then Jamali without getting the explicit consent of Mahavira started on his tour for religious preachings accompanied by a band of 500 monks. Wandering over villages and towns he came to the town of Sravasti where he put up in the Koshthaka Chaitya in the park named Tinduga. Due to coarse

food he fell ill suffering from high fever. He grew very feeble and being able neither to stand nor to sit he requested his co-monks to spread a grass-mat for him that he might lie upon it for a while and take rest. He wanted to have it done quickly: so strong was the heat of his fever. They began to spread it. Being helplessly irritated by the disease he impatiently inquired whether the grass-mat was spread or not. It was just being spread and the co-monks having in mind the Jaina view 'what is being spread is spread' replied that it spread. Jamali hurried to lie on it but finding it only half-spread he got enraged thinking that the monks told him a lie. The attempt of monks to defend their statement on the ground of the Jaina view proved fruitless. Then Jamali went to the extent of crying down the Jaina view, 'what is being done is done' and opposed to that he promulgated his view, 'what is done is done' and his doctrine came to be known as Bahurata from the fact that the statement of completion (Ram=to stop) can be made only when the process of action is entirely complete. Some monks followed his view and others failing to convince him with all their arguments returned to Mahavira.

Sudarsana helplessly followed her husband's view. At that time she was putting up with the potter Dhanka who was a sincere layman devoted to the creed of Mahavira. She tried her utmost to convert him to her husband's view but all her efforts were fruitless. Dhanka perfectly understood that she was oppressed by Karmic forces of strong delusion and he was waiting for an opportunity to enlighten her as to the falsehood of her view and to bring her back to the sublime creed of Mahavira.

One day, Dhanka was baking pots in the kiln and just near that Sudarsana was sitting absorbed in her scriptural studies. The former took a piece of burning charcoal and threw it on the garment of Sudarsana which began to burn. She hurriedly asked him, "why did you burn my garment?" Dhanka replied with all humility, "Madam! it is not burnt, because, according to your view, what is being burnt is not

burnt, and so you cannot complain that your garment is burnt." His line of argument was practically effective as it appealed to her and she began to suspect the folly of her husband's view. She ultimately realized the error and approached her husband to enlighten him on the point. All her attempts to bring Jamali back to the right path failed. She returned to Mahavira and readopted his creed after the usual repentance and confession. Jamali preached his false creed with a good deal of zeal and in the long run he reaped the fruit of it.

From the narration of the above story it is quite clear how illustration (Udaharana) played an important part in the Indian syllogism and there was not much scope for theoretical thread-bare discussion unaccompanied by an illustration. It is also clear how people took pleasure in dialectics. Considering the Jaina as well as the Bahurata view, it is plain that the Jaina view is more theoretical while Jamlai takes only a practical view. The realistic—as they call it view of the Jainas is not without its value though practically it might not sound cogent. Take for instance their realistic statement that Man is dying every moment: the water of life is gradually oozing out. When a boy grows into a man, as a matter of fact, there is no pleasure for he has only neared the grave by so many years. The statement that a man is dying every moment might not look practically sound but it has behind it a deep significance which has influenced the Jaina outlook on life.

Bahurata was the first Ninhaba (schism) and there are other six Ninhabas which have been described in Jaina works of the Svetambara section. So far as my knowledge of Digambara works goes there is no mention of these: there we hear of various (counted always by hundreds) deviating doctrines under the head of Mittya Darsana. It is necessary that these schisms should be studied in details to see whether any of them were anticipating some of our modern ideas. It is necessary to remember here that these Ninhabas were not

so much as independent religious schools, as they differed from the orthodox stock in a point or so.\*

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\* We find material for this study in Bhagavati (especially the Sk. Commentaries thereon), Sthananga and the Viseshavasyaka Bhashya (2306 onwards) with Sk Commentaries. Quite recently a Hindi article on seven Ninhas is published in Anekanta I. 11-12 written by Pt. Sobhachandra Bhank.

## THE EQUIPMENT OF WILL.

BY

C. R. JAIN.

**T**HERE are three aspects of the Will; (1) it is a substance, (2) it is intelligent, that is conscious, and (3) it is conative, that is to say, it is the centre and abode of impulses. Yet Will is throughout unitary. Knowledge lies hidden and covered up behind the impulses, as shown in my *Jaina Psychology*. The substantive aspect of Will is really the soul substance itself, for Will is only the soul involved in matter. The impulses themselves are to be conceived as existing in Will as phases or aspects of a partless whole; they are not separate or separable from Will, or from one another; but they may be distinguished and marked off in thought; and they are also able to work and act in a quasi-independent manner. The relation between the Will and the impulses is like that between the rhythm of a melody and the notes and tones composing it. Every moment, Will, as a unitary force, is present in the form of rhythm, and the impulses are to it what sounds and notes are to a melody. Each impulse has a central idea round which it is formed; but all sorts of experiences may be associated with this central idea.

It should be noted that Will only preserves the experiences of pleasure and pain, but nothing else. What does not interest it—and pleasure and pain are both calculated to awaken interest—remains unnoticed. For this reason we have

no memory of that which does not 'stir' us and therefore does not impress us with its presence. The expectancy on the part of the Will of an experience of pleasure or pain is requisite for an impression being made on it. It should also be noted that every conscious experience forms but a single indivisible 'record,' though it may comprise an infinity of detail in itself. These records are preserved in the form of modification of the existing rhythm in one of the impulses, and, by necessary implication, also in the Will as a whole; for Will is necessarily indivisible in its substantive aspect. A new rhythm is thus established with each experience of pleasure or pain.

Let it be noted that every new rhythm thus established in the Will is also unitary and simple; it is not a compound of an existing rhythm with a new one. There is no other way in which the unitary Will can be impressed. The change of rhythm is dependent not on the occurrence of an experience, but on Will's being interested in it, that is to say on its being affected with a feeling of like or dislike for it. If the Will remains absolutely unaffected by an experience and is not led to entertain a feeling of like or dislike for it, as is the case with highly advanced Ascetics, no new impression will be made on it. We notice that our impulses are strengthened by the repetition of similar excitement, and weakened by the refusal to be moved by the experience, and also by the cessation of the repetition; they may be destroyed when the Will completely withdraws its attention from the outside world and becomes altogether indifferent to it and its concerns. Nevertheless if it remains attached to a single object in the world outside itself, the destruction of the impulses cannot be achieved, since Will is unitary, and cannot be partly freed and partly held in bonds.

It is not to be supposed that like and dislike are opposite terms, and that the dislike of an object means the complete obliteration of the element of attraction for it. They are both forms of excitement, and where one is predominant the other may be latent or sub-latent.

When we intensely like a thing we hold it in our embrace, so to speak, and do not wish ever to be parted from it; but when we dislike an object, and the dislike is intense, we do not sit quiet, but try to push it away from ourselves, and may even proceed to destroy it. The feeling that is really opposed to like and dislike both is that of tranquillity, that is, a total absence of excitement; for like and dislike are both only two forms of internal excitement.

Conceived as force, Will is not to be regarded in terms of material energy, actual or potential. The strength or weakness of the Will is not a quantitative but a qualitative factor. A pure Soul cannot act on matter; it cannot even push or displace an atom physically. Will's intensity may be expressed by saying that it is completely Self-centred in the highest form, and the least so in the lowest manifestation. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the effect of an intense emotion may be measured in quantitative terms through bodily excitement. Only the rhythm is changed in Will with each impression.

With reference to the association of matter, the 'branches and twigs' on the trunk of the Will are composed of subtle invisible matter, which it draws to itself through the sensory nerves. Each psychosis has its appropriate material adjunct which is deposited with the will. An additional matter pours in through the senses, it goes to form a sort of adhesive paste or cement, in subjection to internal excitement, so that an over-powering craving may be taken to be the effect of the influence of much matter on the soul.

As already stated the energy of the soul substance consists of rhythm, not of force in the ordinary sense of the term. All forms of force, too, probably have a characteristic rhythm, or note, if the word rhythm be objectionable for any particular reason. Rhythm can do anything; it draws together, absorbs, and joins and builds up; it also dissolves and disintegrates; it will break up and demolish compounds and combinations, though precisely how it works may not be known. It imparts shape to shapeless mass, and brings about

changes of form and shape. In the mother's womb it organizes the form that takes birth as a new manifestation of life. Rhythm is able to set in motion delicate nervous mechanisms, producing movements of hands and feet and other bodily organs; it controls and regulates the organic forces stored up in the body. By rousing powerful emotions it can even affect the functioning of the viscera and glands that are all-important in human biology. We know the power that may be exerted by moods like exaltation and depression, though we are far from understanding the manner of working of the operating force.

Judged from the recorded miracles of Saints, the power of rhythm would appear to be almost unlimited. Changes in bodily form and products such as the changing of the blood from red to white, the imparting of a shining lustre to the face, making the body impervious to gravitation, are some of the phenomena produced by an ascetic Will. But rhythm can also affect external nature. Amongst external phenomena may be mentioned the taming of wild natures, the fruition of trees and the appearance of bloom out of season, and the curing of the sick. There are other miracles known that are still more wonderful.

The Law governing the development of soul-force may be laid down as follows: only lower rhythms prevail in the Will when it is clogged with much matter and beset with desire; when desire is subdued, to the degree of Sainthood, higher rhythms arise. It is a corollary to this that the power to perform miracles can only be acquired by him who has no desire to use it in any way, not by him who wants to make a show, or display, or to use it for profit. Even the desire to use it for the less selfish purpose of curing disease will not allow it to develop.

The highest type of miracles are performed only by the Saints endowed with Right Faith, which is a form of belief, but which yet differs from all other kinds of beliefs. Beliefs, too, constitute impulses, and are built up round ideas, like them. The impulse, which is only an idea at first, comes to

anchorage, resting on the element of attraction or repulsion, and digs its roots deep in the soil of personal interests. It then puts out its stems and branches, and throws out ramifications all round, loosening and destroying, at the same time, all opposite tendencies and fixed ideas to the contrary. It may even become an absorbing obsession with certain individuals, *e.g.*, fanatics.

Right Faith is the belief in the Divinity of the soul itself, which is to displace that in the identity with the body in the fulness of time. But this belief differs from all other forms of belief in so far as it is not centred round what may be termed a foreign object; it concerns the soul itself. Impulses are formed in connection with material objects with the aid of the inflowing matter, consequent on the pleasurable or painful experiences of them on the part of the individual. But in connection with Right Faith (properly conceived) there is no external object to give rise to material influx or to be an object of pleasure or pain through the senses. The conviction of the divinity of the soul, is, on the contrary, hostile to the element of attachment to extraneous things altogether. There is, therefore, no fresh impulse formed in the mind in connection with Right Faith; only the existing wrong impulses, fed on the belief in the body being the self, are loosened under its influence, and, in due course of time, destroyed, leaving the soul free and rid, in the end, of will itself, and of all the impulses embedded in it.

As regards the 'registering' of experiences, that is, memory and association of ideas, all the different affective experiences are tacked on to their appropriate impulses, that is to say, that each experience is gathered through an impulse which is principally concerned in its experiencing, for every perception, it will be noted, is only cognized by the will with the aid of some particular impulse as explained in the Jaina Psychology. An orange, for instance, may be admired for its colour, or flavour, or for its perfect shape or freshness, and there may a number of other points of interest and view which become operative when the enjoyment of a fruit of the

orange species is concerned. But the Will may not approach it from all these various standpoints at once, but only from one of them. This is evident from the fact that when attending to the colour of an orange we are not also at the same time attending to its taste, or shape, or anything else. All the experiences in which a particular aspect of a thing is prominently brought out would, therefore, accrue to the impulse concerned in their experiencing, and will be so many accretions to it. This is why our impulses grow strong by indulgence.

To understand the part played by Will in recollection, we begin with the fact that each psychosis represents a multiplicity of objects presented to our consciousness at the same time. When I enjoy an orange, it is not that the fact of the existence or taste of the orange alone is noticed by the mind and nothing else. The place where, the time when, the friends in whose company the fruit is eaten—all these play a very important part in the experience, and the whole psychosis is recorded in the Will, as a single indivisible experience, not merely the existence of the orange as an isolated fact. In this way all the individual experiences in which the orange fruit occupies the central place will be allotted to the orange-impulse. But if the orange experience was a secondary matter and the central place was occupied by something else in the experience, then the allotment would not be made to the orange-impulse but to the one which was principally concerned in the experience. You have, therefore, the orange experiences principally allotted to one impulse, which we have termed the orange-impulse, and also secondarily comprised in a number of other impulses, as being contiguous with something else that matter chiefly at the time.

Now, in recollection if you allow the mind to dwell on a particular idea (e.g., an orange), past experiences of different kinds centred round that idea (in this instance an orange), will begin to unfold themselves in recollection, and the process will be continued so long as Will remains interested in the search. The rhythm actually present in the mind which

is the guiding factor in recollection it is that really determines when satisfaction is deemed to be obtained; for the mind starts with a certain sort of a hint or clue about the idea which it seeks to recall, and this hint or clue is itself a kind of rhythm. The process is brought to an end when an idea is recalled which corresponds to the clue-rhythm in the mind. This is the basis of the principle of similarity in recollection.

When an experience has been recalled with the aid of the clue, its detail will tend to pass under review if the mind at all linger on it. This will be the working of the principle of contiguity. Similarity thus leads the mind to a memory record of an experience, and contiguity brings out its detail, which is recovered with the recalled rhythm, as it is embedded in it. At times attention wanders away from the object of search when it discovers something which interests it more, and a new train of thought may be started that way. Thus even the whole line of thought may become changed if the mind suddenly becomes interested in something that becomes the central object of attention, instead of the one that was responsible for the starting of the process of recollection originally.

It is necessary to emphasize that impulses are not formed except on the intervention of the personal element in the form of *raga* (attraction) and *dvesha* (repulsion); for without the personal element knowledge alone might be evoked but no feelings, and without the excitement characteristic of a feeling state no fusion of spirit and matter can take place. All sensations are accompanied by what is termed a feeling tone; pure knowing, absolutely unaccompanied by the agitated state known as the feeling tone, is only possible for the highest Saints who have killed out their desires completely. All others only act with their will, the sum-total of desires and impulses, whether they be engaged in an act of knowing or enjoying a thing. Even when a man thinks that he is absolutely indifferent to a thing, he is really under a delusion, for his knowledge of the thing, say an orange, has

only accrued to him through the activity of the agitated state of the soul, termed impulse, and in this instance, the orange-impulse, which agitated state itself is ample evidence of the state of his will in relation to oranges. If he were absolutely indifferent to oranges there would be no orange agitation or impulse present in his consciousness, and, as shown in the "Jaina Psychology," he would not even know of the presence of an orange. This is the case with all embodied souls, who have not attained to the eradication of their impulsions. In other words, perfect indifference would mean a state of agitationless tranquillity, which is inconsistent with the agitated state that is called impulse. But perfect tranquillity is only possible when the last trace of the regard for bodily welfare is eliminated by the soul. It follows from this that impulses are not destroyed one by one, but all together with the destruction of the personal element, the sense of attachment to the body. Suppressed and subdued impulses are very deceptive at times, and appear to be non-existent; but they have the habit of springing up, Phoenix like, from their ashes, and when they do so we are enabled to realize that they were merely dormant. The truth is that all actions of embodied living beings are performed through the intervention of the body, *i.e.*, the bodily regard. The impulses are, therefore, not separate or separable from one another, but only so many different phases or aspects of one single tendency, the body impulse, and can, therefore, be destroyed, not one by one, but only all together, with the destruction of the body-impulse itself. This is supported by the further fact that the withdrawal of attention from the body and its being fixed on the soul, in itself suffices to suspend the functioning of all impulses at once. For this reason, so long as the will is interested, however remotely it may, in gratifying a single impulse, be it even the one that is fed by the interest in the bit of a strip termed *langoti*, there can be no getting rid of the body-impulse, and not possible to attain *nirvana*.

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## NOTES & NEWS.

Geologists carrying out a survey in connection with the proposed extension of the Pacific Great Eastern Railway in British Columbia have found a continuous train of giant tracks, 12 inches in diameter, and they estimate the beasts to have been approximately 100 feet long and weighing many tons.

Accounts in Puranas of an ancient world are thus demonstrated to be not fiction but facts by science.

\* \* \*

Mr. Ibrahim, one of the persons imprisoned at Cawnpore is a German convert to Islam. The proverbial zeal of a fresh convert is well illustrated here.

\* \* \*

A Buddhist Vihara at Sarnath will be formally opened in November 1931. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. N. Mukherjee as the President of the Mahabodhi Society has sent an invitation to the Viceroy to perform the formal ceremony and the founder of the society, His Holiness A. Dharmapala has invited Buddhists of all countries to participate in this historic event.

Buddhism is a living religion, professed by the Emperors of China and Japan, and is the religious faith of one-fifth of the entire human race. It is after 800 years that the Buddhists have been able to erect this Mula-Gandha-Kuti Vihara at Sarnath, near Benares, whereabout 2518 years ago Prince Siddhartha preached to his first five disciples known in History as the Five Bhikkus.

The site lies 600 feet east of the Dhamek Stupa. The architecture is in keeping with the original Buddhist style of Buddha Gaya and is ascribed to be Pre-Asoka in character.

It has a central hall where meetings are to be organized by Buddhist scholars and classes are to be held. The main tower is 110 feet high. The only image of Buddha in the shrine is being made in the Jaipur School of Art.

The founder of the Mahabodhi Society came to India about 40 years ago, when Sarnath was a jungle. He arranged the purchase of a few acres of land where a residential quarter for Buddhist monks was built. In 1922 Sir Harcourt Butler laid the foundation stone of the present Vihara. The Government of India permitted the society to build its Vihara with as much land as they wanted; and expressed its willingness to lay out a park at its own cost around the new Vihara when it was complete.

The society has schemes also to found there an international institute of Buddhists from foreign countries to carry on research work in different branches of Buddhism.

\* \* \*

Look at this picture, and look at that. The Deogarh temples have been lying in ruins. The Government decision to restore them and to place them in the custody of the Jains was made several years ago. But the Jains have taken no steps to move in the matter. What wonder if judgment goes against them by default.

\* \* \*

There are many crying needs of the Jain community. The establishment of a Jain Museum of archaeology would be a deed of greater religious merit than the building of a hundred new temples, and the consecration of a million new images. And there is more than ample material at hand, and there is a number of willing workers to take up the project.

\* \* \*

The organization and good government of Jain temples and of the properties and funds dedicated and appertaining thereto is another urgent work. Will the Jains think of establishing a committee like the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee of the Sikhs and carry through the Indian Parliament a Bill like the Sikh Gurudwara Act.

—AJIT PRASADA.

**A Peep into the Future.**

(ASSOCIATED PRESS OF INDIA)

*Bombay, October '28.*

A disciple of His Holiness Gurudeo Shree Shantivijaya Maharaj, who resides on the heights of Mount Abu, has obtained from the latter the following forecast of coming events :—

His Holiness believes that the present unrest will end in the very near future. From November 1, 1931, the rule of peace will begin and His Holiness expects all to pray for at least one hour on November 1 and March 19, 1932. The latter date in his opinion is very important.

On November 1, 1931, a peaceful atmosphere will prevail, from 4-52 p.m. To be exact, rapid progress towards peace will be noticed from November 5, 1931 from 51 minutes 35 seconds past 4 p.m.

Considering the rights given to Canada, India will get about 12 annas in the rupee and in some matters, about 12¾ annas in the rupee. There will be very great difference of opinion among the British Indian delegates, the Ruling Princes and the Ministers of the British Cabinet. At least some of the representatives of the Ruling Princes will try their best to bring about peace between the Congress and the Government and also they will try to support the Congress.

Occasions for a breakdown will arise before the final settlement, and all hopes will seem to be shattered even so much as five minutes prior to the final conclusions.

Negotiations, which will result in peace, will begin at 6-35 p.m. on March 19, 1932, and that day shall for ever be written in letters of gold in the history of the world. There will be complete peace and a final settlement by April 29, 1932, and "everybody will be attending to his business." As long as there is no settlement in India, this peace will be occasionally disturbed.

On February 1, 1933, a great war will be declared. On January 12, 1934, it will magnify itself into unimaginable

natural phenomena and catastrophies spreading havoc and misery all round. The war itself will be without a parallel in the history of the world. During this period there will be a civil war in which guns, swords and other weapons will be used and in the end there will even be a hand to hand fight. Everybody will take part in this war.

Finally, the Maharaj enjoins that every one who wants to save himself should meditate upon the Mantra. "Om, Hrim Arham Namah," He says, "Remove the feeling of war. Respect every human being and love every creature, even if he may be a Government servant or a Ruling Prince. Remember Love's return shall be Love and even Government will act with nobility in granting rights to India."

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
### The work of the Jain Community.

Mr. Chaitan Das Jain, Secretary of the All-India Jain Association, writes :—

It is proposed to form the following committees to carry out the work of the Jain community. All those who are interested in its welfare are requested to give their suggestions in this connection :—

1. A general Working Committee for the whole of India.
2. A working committee for each province.
3. An Arbitration Board to settle disputes.
4. An Education Board.
5. A committee to protect Civic Rights.
6. A committee for the publication of Jain Literature.
7. A committee for social reform and economic uplift.
8. A committee for Jain Law.

Those who will be kind enough to offer themselves to work on any of those committees are requested to write to the General Secretary, Malhipur, Saharanpur Post.



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